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Abstract 
Purpose: China has the potential to become a major source of innovation for the world. The scientific 
investment is in place and rapidly growing. But in order to reap the benefits of this investment its 
organisations will have to become better at managing innovation. One of the key elements of innovation 
management is the determination and implementation of a sound technology strategy. The purpose of this 
paper is to offer a framework and a detailed overview of what it entails to develop and implement a 
technology strategy. 
Design/methodology/approach: The methodology adopted is observation and literature survey. 
Findings: The paper emphasizes the alignment of the strategy with the organisational competencies and 
the strategic context, as well as the capacity to manage risk. The attention is also drawn on the need to 
find better ways for intellectual property protection, leveraging the Chinese market to explore 
opportunities for innovative ideas and the need to create less hierarchical organisations, that enable 
creative thinking. 
Originality/value: This paper is an original summary of a wide range of research results on technology 
strategy. 
Keywords: Technology led strategy, Innovation, China 
Paper type: Literature review 
 
 
1. Introduction 
China’s capabilities are changing and most observers are convinced that we witness a rapid 
transition of China as being the manufacturer for the world into China as a source of innovation. 
Major industrialised countries like Japan, the USA and some parts of Europe remain leaders in 
technology development and innovation, but China is rapidly catching up as an important nation 
in scientific developments and it has become one of the emerging destinations for foreign direct 
investment in R&D. The number of scientific papers published by Chinese scholars in 
international journals, the amount of investment in R&D, the number of patent applications by 
Chinese citizens and organisations, etc. all suggest a growing capability in science and 
technology (Jakobson, 2007). 
But China’s ambition of becoming a leader in innovation has not always had the expected pay 
off. It has invested heavily in local scientific development. The 10,000s of government, 
university affiliated and non-governmental research-oriented enterprises underpin this effort. But 
proportionally the result of this effort has been limited. Moreover, many have argued that 
China’s innovative capabilities are still today too heavily depending on foreign multinationals: 
the trade off it made by opening its market in order to get transfer of technology, has not always 
had the expected and desired outcome (Li-hua, 2007). 
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Our thesis is that in order to achieve the status of a leader in innovation, China and Chinese 
enterprises will need to invest more in the fusion of its science and technology with management 
capabilities, in particular the ability to manage innovation (de Meyer and Garg, 2005). One of the 
key aspects of innovation management is the capacity to develop and implement a sound 
technology strategy. In the rest of this paper, we will develop a simple model of what the 
definition and the implementation of a technology strategy requires and how this can be applied 
to China. 
 
Figure 1 A simplified description of technology strategy 
2. The basic general framework for technology strategy 
A technology strategy, like any functional strategy, has two purposes. It is on one hand the 
translation of the overall strategy of the organisation into a coherent set of long-term instructions 
for investments for the sub-organizations that are active in technology development. This can 
happen through product or process development or through the development of more general 
technological know-how that can be used in product and process development. But at the same 
time it is also the development of technology-based opportunities or options for the organisation 
to steer future developments, i.e. provide the capabilities that enable the organisation to shape its 
future (de Meyer and Loch, 2008). 
In practice such a strategy is expressed in a set of research and development projects to be 
implemented by the organisation. These projects can be carried out in one organisation, but more 
often they are distributed over a set of laboratories spread out over different locations and 
organisational subdivisions. In many cases, they entail the cooperation from representatives from 
different functional departments or organisational roles. But whatever the organisation, the focus 
of a technology strategy remains on the definition and the development of the portfolio of 
projects. The key decisions in technology strategy are thus the choice of the individual 
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“attractive” projects, but also determining the shape of the portfolio of projects that will support 
the organization’s strategy. 
Decisions like these are taken in a context that determines the success of their implementation. 
Providing insight in technology strategy requires discussions on how the choice of projects and 
project portfolio is made, but also on some of the issues of implementation. In order to discuss 
these we will use a very simplified framework that is shown in Figure 1. In this framework one 
can see that the determination and implementation of a technology strategy is embedded in an 
organisation where there is clear leadership that sets an overall strategic context. Such an 
organisation may create the conditions where creativity can blossom and where market and user 
information may meet the technological capabilities developed within the organization, leading 
to the generation of lots of ideas. Normally, such an organization will have an overload of ideas 
and one of the essential tasks in the determination of the technology strategy is to evaluate 
project on their own merits as well as their contribution within the portfolio. Projects thus 
selected are prime candidates for investment. But in order to succeed, those investment 
opportunities need to be checked with the available capacity of the technology organisation. The 
final project programme will be the result of these three evaluations. Finally, the execution of 
this programme needs to be evaluated and compared to the guidelines that emerged from the 
leadership and the vision. 
3. Creating the strategic context and providing leadership 
Building a successful technology strategy can only happen when the organisation is clear about 
the direction it wants to go in. The technology strategy needs to be tailored to the overall strategy 
of the organisation (Loch, 2000). This requires a clear vision defined by the leadership of the 
organisation as well as the creation of an environment where this vision can be shared by 
colleagues and collaborators. 
The leadership needs to set the goals: what kind of business does the firm want to be in and how 
do you want to position the firm vis à vis the competition. By doing so it also defines what 
should and should not be pursued as innovation projects. A clear vision is the best way to help to 
define the portfolio of projects and the criteria that you need to use to evaluate new opportunities. 
And it helps also when the organisation needs to say no to a new or ongoing. Let us not forget 
that some of the most difficult decisions in innovation are precisely to say no to a project or to 
stop a project that does not deliver the results one had counted on (Staw and Ross, 1987; Royer, 
2003). This part of leadership is particularly difficult in a society that does not feel comfortable 
with coming back on decisions and where stopping a project may be equated with losing face. 
A good vision that can enable the development of a technology strategy should live up to two 
conditions: it has to combine a long-term view with concrete short-term goals and it should not 
be too constraining. The organisation should not feel too comfortable because the challenges are 
defined too far in the future. Technology strategy needs to stretch the organisation beyond its 
comfort zone. But a too constraining and too focused vision is not helpful either. A too narrow 
tunnel vision which constrains technology development to a very narrow path will kill creativity 
and create a false sense of security because the organisation knows too well what it needs to do. 
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Simply providing that clear vision is not sufficient. Real leadership is also ensuring that the rest 
of the organisation has taken ownership of the goals, understands them and acts according to 
them. Innovative leadership requires a lot of communication, convincing and cajoling until the 
vision has been absorbed throughout the organisation. 
This combination of defining and communicating the vision is what we call the creation of the 
strategic context. Organisations rely on it to harness their creativity. Without a clear strategic 
context, creativity may blossom, but it will be disjointed. Strategic context gives purpose and 
direction, benchmarks and role models. It measures progress and shows the way ahead. 
4. Generating the ideas 
Defining a technology strategy requires the existence of raw materials to carry out the evaluation 
and selection of projects and to determine the optimal portfolio. In other words the organisation 
needs good ideas for projects to choose from. Increasing the stock of good project ideas requires 
two things: having access to stimulating information and an environment that stimulates 
creativity to transform this information into project ideas. 
Discussing here what the very rich literature on creativity can offer on how one can stimulate 
creativity to generate project ideas would take us too far away from technology strategy. There is 
however one practical concept that deserves to be mentioned in passing. Over the last ten years 
Kim and Mauborgne [1] have developed their ideas on value innovation, i.e. a structured method 
to discover hidden and underemphasized as well as obsolete performance parameters for a 
product or a service. Once these are known one can redefine the rules of the competitive game by 
innovating by reducing the performance offer on obsolete parameters and investing ahead of the 
competition in the yet undiscovered performance parameters. This is for all practical purposes a 
more strategic view on what the quality movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s argued 
about design quality. In that earlier view it was argued that any product or service could be 
characterised by eight performance parameters: functionality, ease of use, durability, 
serviceability, the operating cost, and the cost of complementary assets, system compatibility and 
aesthetics. The customer expectations for each of these performance parameters can be drawn as 
a function of the price the customer is willing to pay for them (Figure 2). If the performance 
parameter is very price elastic (i.e. a steep curve) there is a good opportunity to invest in 
technology development through R&D. If on the contrary the performance parameter has low-
price elasticity (i.e. a flat curve) there is little scope for innovation through technology 
development. What was usually less emphasized in this literature was that the shape of the 
curves can, and probably will, change over time and that what used to be in the past an 
unattractive performance parameter for innovative investments, could well turn out to be a very 
attractive one in the years to come. Kim and Mauborgne deserve the credit for having made the 
implications of this dynamic far more operational. 
On the second issue of getting access to stimulating information there are two important points to 
be made. The first one is that the development of a technology strategy is the result of the 
interaction between the stock of tacit and explicit organizational knowledge created by the firm 
and the latent and explicit needs of the customers or users. From the earliest studies on 
innovation (Myers and Marquis, 1969) the observations have constantly been pointing in the 
same direction: most of the information used by innovators was personal knowledge, rather than 
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personally researched knowledge. Only 8 per cent of innovative information came from 
experimentation and calculation and 7 per cent from printed materials. Such empirical findings, 
and those of countless studies that followed this first work, suggest that:  
[. . .] science and technology are vital tools that need to be applied effectively and developed 
selectively. But [. . .] innovation is more a matter of flexible, productive and focused employee 
relations in the workplace than it is the result of technological resources or the impact of science 
[. . .] (Carnegie and Butlin, 1993). 
This seems to suggest that the organizational knowledge, which is embedded in the interactions 
between the employees of the firm, is an important source for project ideas that provide the input 
for a technology strategy.  
 
 
Figure 2. Elasticity of performance functions 
But one needs to go further than to see the stock of wisdom about technology, administration and 
management systems as the only or main source of project ideas. The set of projects out of which 
a strategy can be built, is the result of the interaction between this organizational knowledge and 
the experience and tacit knowledge that users and customers have about the fulfilment of their 
needs: the fulfilment of the explicit and tacit needs of the users define whether a new product, 
process or system provides a significant change in the value/price relationship. Innovation exists 
only when one can couple the organizational know how with the users needs. The strategic 
choices about technology can only be appropriate, if they are made in a way that is consistent 
with the evolving interests of the firm and the users. The managerial challenge for the 
development of a technology strategy is thus to mobilize both the organisational know how and 
the user’s know how and have a healthy interaction between them. 
The second point is precisely about the need to listen to this information coming from outside the 
organisation. Innovation without intimate customer and user knowledge is not possible.  
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von Hippel (1976) made as one of the first the point that in many cases the source of innovative 
ideas lays outside the organization, often with users. They have a stake in the development of the 
innovation because they can reap the benefits of it. His original example was that of scientific 
instruments. In that case the user often develops a handcrafted prototype that is meeting his or 
her unique specifications. With creativity the supplier of scientific instruments can probably see 
the wider applications and transform this prototype into an industrial product. A similar process 
happened with internet usage. In many cases, it is a frustrated user that develops a software 
improvement or an additional service and many internet-based companies have been successful 
by exploiting the ideas of the users. 
Often one thinks that this knowledge is available only in sophisticated markets. Or at least that 
was what the proponents of the international product life cycle argued (Vernon, 1966). But today 
this is no longer true. We know from empirical studies that emerging markets in China, South 
and South East Asia, Southern Africa or Latin America are not the most supportive for an 
innovator (de Meyer and Garg, 2005). Customers tend to be more conservative, markets are 
heterogeneous and market data are often not available. But they do have often needs that are 
different from the users in the traditional industrialised countries and that can be sources for new 
projects in technological development. The problem is that in societies like China there is very 
little good market research available, and consumers tend not to express their opinions. 
Individual consumers also tend to prefer to be part of a group and may express not their deepest 
thoughts. For innovation this is not good, because one needs to get the ideas of the trend setters 
and individual opinion leaders. 
Doz et al. (2001) have developed the concept of the metanational organization, or an 
international organization that is able to take advantage of its global presence to combine 
information and knowledge from different parts of the world in order to come up with an 
innovation. Let us take a stylized example to illustrate this. Assume you want to come up with a 
new mobile phone that combines the sophisticated use of SMS as one finds it in the Philippines 
(which is one of the more advanced markets for mobile messaging (de Meyer and Garg, 2005)) 
or China, the patents of Qualcom in the USA, the fashion trends for electronic gadgets as it is 
prevalent in Los Angeles, the technology of miniaturisation developed in Japan or Korea and the 
competitive benchmarking with Nokia in Finland. You need antennae in different parts of the 
world to capture the knowledge and you need the ability to combine this knowledge and roll it 
out. Doz et al. call these three activities sensing, melding and deploying. Sensing is the activity 
whereby a firm attempts to gather knowledge about user needs all over the world. In the 
“melding” (a combination of welding and melting) one needs to have the entrepreneurial insight 
to identify an opportunity to create an innovative product, service or process. The deployment 
also requires the cumulated wisdom of the organization. In order to roll out the innovation and 
get global leverage as quickly as possible one needs to be flexible about building the most 
efficient and rapidly scalable global supply chain. 
5. Evaluating the individual projects 
In the simplified diagram in Figure 1 project evaluation and portfolio evaluation are shown in 
parallel and not sequential. This reflects the interactive nature of these evaluation procedures: 
often individual projects need to be evaluated within a context of other projects, e.g. because of 
their spill-over effects. And the evaluation of a portfolio may show a gaping hole in the portfolio, 
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triggering the development of a new project proposal. But in order to have a portfolio one needs 
first projects. Therefore, we will start first with the evaluation of individual projects. 
The most straightforward approach is that technology projects are to be evaluated as any other 
investment made by the organisation, i.e. through some kind of a net present value calculation. 
The logic is correct, but many authors and practitioners have pointed out that these NPV analyses 
overlook the value inherent in the strategic flexibility that is created by technology projects, in 
particular when they are seen as sequential investments, i.e. where the knowledge built up 
through one project (or a phase in the project) may lead to new insights and adjusted projects and 
new investments. As a consequence, the traditional NPV methods are often seen as too 
conservative (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). Nevertheless, they do provide some insight in the 
value of a project, in particular, as we argued elsewhere, when they are used as a tool for 
sensitivity analysis. By evaluating what the most conservative hypotheses are that need to be 
fulfilled to make a technology project worthwhile, one can get a good idea of the risks involved 
in the project. 
Given the often uncertain nature of projects such NPV methods have been complemented with 
questionnaires and systems that attempt to rank the relative attractiveness of individual projects 
or with scoring methods that weigh in one way or another the risk involved in the project with 
the potential benefits[2]. Often these methods consist of long organization-specific lists of 
questions about the market potential, the technology gap, the strength of the team, the 
competitive position, the ability to protect the result of the project, the spill-over effects, etc. 
Based on the results of these questionnaires projects can be ranked according to a number of 
weighted decision criteria. Outcomes of these questionnaires may be a relative positioning of the 
project or an absolute ranking. A rough approach consists then in the comparison of the outcome 
of this exercise with the capacity of the organisation and to fill up the capacity with the top 
ranked projects. This approach has the drawback that it has difficulty capturing the real risks 
involved (both upside and a downside risk), and it very often cannot take into account the 
positive externalities of the projects. 
These risk lists do have value because they help an organization to reduce the unforeseeable 
uncertainty into foreseeable uncertainty. They also can help as a tool to get different functions or 
roles of the organisation to exchange information about the projects. In this way, they can be 
very valuable in the evaluation of projects. But most scoring methods fail the test of rigour and 
relevance when it comes to selecting projects. 
Complementary to NPV methods and rankings it can be helpful to consider the selection activity 
a process through which the organisation attempts to analyse to what extent the conditions are 
favourable to carry out the project within the organization. Projects may be intrinsically 
interesting but the organisation may not have the capabilities to bring them to a successful end. 
We have found it useful to evaluate projects on five questions, organised in a decision tree 
(Figure 3) (de Meyer, 1999) and based to a large extent on the work of Teece (1986). 
In analysing the decision tree one needs to take into account that there are two strong 
simplifications in this decision tree. The first simplification is that answers to the five questions 
are considered here to be binary, i.e. yes or no, weak or strong, etc. In reality this is not the case 
and answers often are more complex and conditional. The second simplification is assumed that 
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the answers to the questions are fixed. In practice it is precisely the managerial action that 
enables the organisation to change the answer and thus eventually improve the attractiveness of a 
project. 
 
Figure 3. Decision tree to evaluate the potential of a technology project 
 
The five questions are as follows: 
(1) How easily can the organisation protect the know-how developed in the projects 
and thus appropriate the benefits derived from the project in the form of rents. Such a 
protection can of course, take many forms. Patents can play a role, but since we know the 
limitations of patents in the protection of intellectual property rights (von Hippel, 1976) 
we also need to take into account other forms of protection such as brands, trade secrets, 
copyrights, a monopoly on critical resources, speed in development, market dominance, 
etc. [3] For organisations in China this is a particularly challenging question to answer, 
given the lack of respect that still exists for intellectual property. The portfolio of 
protective measures will be composed very differently than it would be in industrialised 
societies. 
(2) Is there already a dominant design (or market paradigm) for the product or the 
system in the way it is defined by Utterback and Abernathy (1975) (and confirmed by 
many empirical follow up studies). The unit of analysis in their model is a new 
technology, or new combination of existing technologies. The model argues that you can 
distinguish four stages in the development of the new technology. In the first, fluid, phase, 
there will be a high degree of activity in product innovations, which are offered to the 
market. There are several reasons for this, but the two main ones are the low barriers to 
entry, and the difficulty to carry out market research in emerging markets and thus the 
need to experiment. This first phase usually leads to the emergence of what has become 
commonly known as a dominant design. It has lots of scientific descriptions, but in brief 
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it is a sort of milestone or quasi-standard in an industry. In a sense the product that 
becomes a dominant design embodies the requirements of many classes of users, even 
though it may not perfectly match the requirements of one particular group of users. The 
emergence of the dominant design changes the nature of the competition completely. 
From competition based on the functionality of the product, one moves to a competition 
based on cost and quality. The challenge is not any more to define your product, but to 
offer a product similar to the one from the competition at a lower price. That requires 
usually heavy investments in automation, business reengineering and a much leaner 
organization. This is a period of intensive process innovation. Finally, there is a fourth 
phase in the technological life cycle, when innovation, both in process and product, 
becomes less relevant to the survival in the competitive arena, and where the context in 
which, and the amenities that come with the product, are an essential element of the 
competition. For the purpose of our analysis it is at this stage sufficient to understand 
whether for the project at hand the dominant design has emerged. It will be clear that the 
market relation is a very different one before and after the breakthrough of the dominant 
design. Before that breakthrough one needs to be in close contacts with customers and/or 
users in order to keep the finger on their pulse and to observe the sometimes quite 
dramatic changes in customer preferences. After the breakthrough of the dominant design 
standard techniques of market research will be sufficient to measure the smaller changes 
in customer preferences. 
This model is related to the concept of disruptive technologies (Christensen, 1997): the 
emergence of a disruptive technology creates the conditions for the start of a fluid phase 
and the redefinition of a dominant design. 
(3) What is the speed with which a prototype can be developed? Speed of 
development has been at the core of a lot of studies in the 1980s and 1990s of previous 
century [4]. Iansiti (1995) showed convincingly that the performance of technology 
development and the competitive position of the firm are influenced significantly by the 
speed with which prototypes can be turned around. And more recently the work of 
Thomke (2002, 2006) on experimentation provides interesting insights in the competitive 
influence of rapid experimentation and the role of computer aided tools therein. It has 
been argued by Williamson and Zeng (2007) that one of the advantages of Chinese 
companies in innovation is precisely its speed and flexibility in development. 
(4) How important are the complementary assets in the realization of the benefits 
provided by the project (Doz and Hamel, 1998). The importance of overcoming network 
externalities in the success of a project have been widely documented and partners can 
play an important role in building up the network of products and processes that enable 
the realisation of the full benefit of the project. The success of a project will depend to a 
large extent on the importance of these partners: the more important they are the more 
one is dependent on the availability of these complementary assets. The success of a 
project will thus often depend on the balance of power with these partners. 
(5) The availability of the complementary assets is an important issue. Therefore, a 
fifth question is how these complementary assets will be accessible. Are these 
complementary assets available on a competitive basis and can the organization put the 
suppliers of these assets in competition with each other, or are the providers specialised 
(and thus only offered by a monopolist or through an oligopoly. 
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The decision tree suggests clearly that there is a particular sequence to be followed in answering 
the questions. A few examples will help us to understand how this can be used to evaluate the 
potential of a project and at the same time how one gets some insights in the implementation 
challenges. 
Assume that protection is relatively easy in the industry concerned (think for example of the 
pharmaceutical industry where patents may work, even in China) and the project will lead to 
patentable know how. In this case the appropriability of the rents is tight. Assume also that the 
dominant design or the market paradigm is not yet known. The role of complementary assets in 
this case cannot yet be important (otherwise the dominant design would be determined by the 
complementary assets). One is in a situation where competition is hampered by the protection, 
but where the innovator will need the time to shape the dominant design. The problem for the 
innovator is in this case mostly bridging the cash gap between the investment in the project and 
the cash flow derived from sales. These are projects that can be very promising on condition the 
organisation has sufficient cash. Success will also depend on a good connection with the market 
in order to make emerge the dominant design. 
If on the contrary the dominant design is known, then one has to focus on the complementary 
assets. If those are not important the project has the potential of being a success: it is easy to 
protect the IP, the market needs are known and the organization is not dependent on third parties 
for its success. If they happen to be important, the organisation will need to contract or develop a 
partnership for access to these complementary assets. But it does so from a position of strength. 
The more difficult cases happen at the lower side of the decision tree, i.e. when the know-how 
generated by the project is difficult to protect. Assume this case and assume also that the 
dominant design is not known. In this case the project will require constant adjustment to be in 
tune with the changing needs of the users and customers, but this from a rather uncomfortable 
position of weakness with respect to IP protection. Critical to the success of the project is the 
speed with which these adjustments can be performed, i.e. it will depend on the speed of 
experimentation and turning around a prototype. If that speed is high there are still some good 
chances for the project to succeed, on condition that one can stay informed of changes in market 
conditions and customer preferences through a very close coupling to the customers. If on the 
other hand the speed of prototype turnaround is low (and even worse if it is combined with high 
costs of prototype development), the project has very little chance of succeeding. The only 
consolation may be that while the downside risks are high for such a project, few other 
organisations may venture in this field, and the margins may be high if success is achieved. 
Following the path of weak protection, but with an existing dominant design, we have, as in the 
upper branches of the decision tree, to consider the importance of the complementary assets. If 
they are not important, speed and quality of management will have to replace the weak position 
in terms of protection. A good knowledge and interaction with customers is also important to 
success, but chances are fair. If on the other hand the complementary assets are important, one 
needs to consider how they are available. If they are delivered on a competitive basis, and access 
is easy, one needs to ensure that the right contracts are in place. The negotiation position is less 
favourable, but not impossible. If these assets are in the hands of a monopoly or an oligopoly, the 
success of the project is not really yours, but can only be realised through a close integration with 
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those who control the complementary assets. Such integration can take many different forms: 
selling the IP, creating an integrated organisation, etc. 
It is worth coming back to an earlier comment: this is not a deterministic model because 
appropriate managerial action can change the answers to some of the five questions. For example, 
the answer to the first question about protection is perhaps more about what one can do to 
improve the protection so that one feels comfortable enough to answer that one is on the upper 
branches of the decision tree. The value of the decision tree is probably in the reflection that one 
can initiate in the organisation on how to get the most benefits out of a given project. 
6. Selecting the portfolio 
Once the organization has selected the candidates for the projects for technology development, it 
needs to figure out how attractive the collection of projects is and how that collection or portfolio 
supports the overall business strategy. Three broad categories of solutions have been proposed 
over the years. A first stream of ideas comes out of the operations research literature and 
proposes optimisation methods for portfolio selection, mainly based on mathematical 
programming. A second, more recent stream of literature sees technology projects as options and 
applies option theory to the project portfolio. A third, far more qualitative approach, suggests 
visualizing the project portfolio in series of matrices that help the managers in qualitative 
decision making on what the most appropriate portfolio is. 
Mathematical programming models have long been proposed (Souder, 1973; Baker and Freeland, 
1975). They have the attraction that they lead to an optimal portfolio, can easily take into account 
the interactions between the different projects, and allow for sensitivity analysis. Though this 
body of knowledge has provided a great number of examples in different industries and for 
different type of portfolios, and can rely on the rich literature on mathematical programming, it 
never has really caught on with practitioners (Schmidt and Freeland, 1992). Often the reasons 
cited for the limited application is the limited capability of these models to incorporate risks, as 
well as the need for extensive and reliable information. The data collection needed to make the 
model practical was considered to be too heavy to make it a valuable exercise. Another reason 
may well be that the academic world has emphasized too strongly the sophistication of the model 
and has in the process forgotten that these models need to be understood by managers (Hall and 
Nauda, 1990) in order to be trusted. Too often the models have been perceived to be black boxes 
that did not allow managers to gain managerial insight. This does not mean that there were no 
successful applications. Loch et al. (2001) describe an interesting example of such an adoption. 
The mathematical model used is a fairly simple mixed integer linear programme but the 
emphasis of the exercise is more on the use of standard methods proposed by the product 
innovation literature on how to transfer knowledge, e.g. gatekeepers, weak ties, overcoming 
stickiness of information, etc. (Szulansky, 1996) in order to improve the utilisation of the model 
and its diffusion throughout the organisation. 
A second approach proposed in the literature, but not yet widely practised by managers is to use 
real options to evaluate the project portfolio. Real options’ thinking has been proposed for 
strategy development beyond technology strategy (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; McGrath, 1997). 
Applying real options is really arguing that an investment in a technological project is buying a 
ticket, e.g. for access to a profitable market in the case of an R&D project at some time in the 
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future. In this way investing in a technology project is like holding an option analogous to a 
financial call option. With the discovery of new information and the resulting reduction of 
uncertainty, one can adjust the initial technological strategy. As with financial options this 
provides a flexibility to adapt to new information. It thus improves the value of the investment in 
the project because it enhances the upside potential, while limiting the downside losses relative 
to the initial expectations about the project. This real option approach goes contrary to what NPV 
approaches do to technology projects: NPV treatment understates the value of an investment in 
technological development, real options enhances its value. 
This approach has brought some early interesting insights. For example, Huchzermacher and 
Loch (2001) argue that in R&D one faces more diverse forms of uncertainty than in traditional 
financial applications. Apart from the uncertainty in pay-off there are also higher uncertainty 
market payoffs, project budgets, product performance, market requirements and project 
schedules. They find the interesting and unexpected result that if uncertainty is resolved or cost 
and revenues occur after all decisions have been made, more variability may smear out 
contingencies and thus reduce the value of flexibility. In addition variability may reduce the 
probability of flexibility ever being exercised, which also reduces its value. 
But there is also quite some criticism on the real options approach to strategy. In a relatively 
recent debate Adner and Levinthal (2004a) argued strongly that real options cannot be applied to 
strategy (and by extension to technology strategy) because one of the major assumptions of real 
options is that abandonment can be done efficiently. They express strong doubts that 
organisations can do this: 
[. . .] the greater the role of an organisation in molding the possible course of an initiative after an 
initial investment, the greater the organisational challenges and the strategic trade-offs associated 
with applying a real option. As a result the less helpful the logic is for guiding strategy (Adner and 
Levinthal, 2004b). 
This is clearly a debate that needs further research. 
A third, more qualitative approach attempts to present the portfolio of projects in a coherent and 
usually visually attractive way, such that managers can discuss the merits and weaknesses of the 
portfolio. This has been the result of the reflections of quite a few consulting organisations, and 
virtually all of the big consulting firms have developed their own set of matrices[5]. In Figure 4, 
there are a few examples of such matrices. The purpose is usually to map the different projects 
(often represented by circles or squares that given an indication of relative investment size) in the 
portfolio in matrices with dimensions like: 
• the risks involved in the projects versus the expected financial return; 
• the competitive technological position of the organisation vs the maturity of the 
technologies used in the project; 
• the expected cash flows over time; 
• the market position of the organisation in the targeted market segment versus the market 
attractiveness; and 
• the newness of the expected output in compared to similar products or processes in the 
market versus its technological newness. 
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The advantage of these matrices is that they are relatively easy to construct and understand, and 
that they can form a basis for discussion. But the disadvantage is that most of them remain very 
qualitative, become unwieldy when there are many projects and provide little guidance of what a 
good portfolio is, let alone providing an optimal portfolio. There are some guidelines one can 
apply to these matrices, e.g. that an organisation needs to have a balanced portfolio (neither too 
risky nor too conservative), it should not postpone all the positive cash flow towards the end of 
the portfolio life, etc. But the only real managerial advice that one can give for these matrices is 
that the management of the organisation should feel comfortable with it and that the portfolio 
should be in line with the risk level the organisation is willing to take.  
Figure 4. Examples of technology strategy maps 
 
  
 
7. Matching with the capacity of the technological organisation 
The chosen portfolio must be implemented. This may appear to be a simple operational issue, not 
belonging to a discussion on technology strategy. But far too often technology strategies do not 
get implemented because the capacity of the organization to carry out the projects is 
overestimated. The managerial competence of many Chinese organisations often does not match 
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the intellectual capabilities to do the planning of the technology strategy. Anybody will 
understand that a simple calculation whereby the capacity of the organisation to carry out 
technology projects is C and the average load of a project is L that the capacity of the 
organisation is less than C/L because of variability or delays in execution. But the reduction of 
available capacity due to these factors of variation is higher than usually expected and it can be 
shown with fairly reasonable assumptions that the capacity of an organisation is often only 80 
per cent or lower of its theoretical capacity. Therefore, one can try to increase the available 
capacity by effective process management, i.e. eliminating unnecessary variations in workload 
and work processes in order to eliminate distractions and delays, and effective bottleneck 
management (Adler et al., 1996). But from a more strategic perspective the message is that it 
may pay off to take on fewer projects, because they will be processed faster. 
The second consideration in order to avoid congestion is to realise that the capacity of the groups 
involved in technology development often also needs to have the capacity to cope with product 
adaptations, maintenance and needs a buffer to cope with unforeseen uncertainty. 
8. Evaluation 
While it may be a short afterthought to the issue of technology strategies, it is important to 
mention that the loop needs to be closed. In the fast moving economies like in China, there often 
does not seem the time or the willingness to do a post mortem. A technology strategy will be 
effective only when it is regularly reviewed and when the results of the technological projects 
that are the expression of the technology strategy are compared to the overall goals of the 
organisation. At the same time, such a review by a technology steering committee will offer the 
opportunity to check to what extent the learning through the technology development leads to 
new opportunities for the strategy of the organisation. It is in this evaluation process that the two 
purposes of a technology strategy, mentioned at the start of this chapter, will come to full fruition. 
9. Conclusion 
While there is more to be said about technology strategy we want to finish with a few 
summarising statements and a comment on how this applies to Chinese firms. 
The operational expression of a technology strategy is the set of projects that an organisation 
wants to implement. Determining a strategy is selecting the projects and the portfolio of projects. 
In this contribution, we argued that this selection is both a decision and a process. It is a decision 
because the organisation needs to make resource commitments, but it is also a process of 
constant evaluating whether the projects fit the strategy of the organisation and whether the 
organisation has the capability of bringing the projects to a successful end. 
Tools and techniques exits to support the management team in the decision-making process, but 
the acceptance of these tools and techniques driven as much by the quality of the tools as by the 
quality of the technology transfer process that makes these tools palatable to the managers. The 
project portfolio cannot be disconnected from its context. Strategic context and leadership, an 
environment that stimulates creativity, an acute awareness of the capacity of the organisation and 
a commitment to avoid congestion, a clear understanding of the complementary assets and their 
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availability are a few examples of how the context influences the shaping of a technology 
strategy. 
And finally there is no technology strategy without risk. Taking risks requires people to commit 
themselves. Technology strategies without technological leaders who are willing to take risks are 
just documents. All these suggestions are universal in the sense that they apply to firms all over 
the world. But as we hinted at throughout the text there are some particular opportunities and 
challenges for Chinese firms. 
The biggest opportunity is in the information (whether tacit or codified) that Chinese firms can 
obtain from the emerging middle class consumer about innovative ideas that are unique to the 
Chinese market, and that may have global appeal. But the first major challenge is that this 
information is difficult to capture due to ineffective market research, and perhaps a reluctance of 
the lead consumer to reveal his or her preferences. The second big challenge is in the limited 
ability to protect intellectual property (be it patents, brands or trade secrets), and thus the 
challenge of appropriating the economic benefits for the innovator. The third challenge and 
opportunity is in the organizational structure. Implementing a sound technology strategy may be 
hampered by the rather hierarchical organisational structure with sometimes too high respect for 
authority. This does not enhance creativity, or flexibility in reaction. But on the other hand 
Chinese firms have the ability to mobilise massive resources that can help them to implement in 
a very fast way the strategy, once it is determined. 
 
Notes 
1. Kim and Mauborgne (1997); these ideas have been widely documented in their book Blue Ocean 
Strategy (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005). 
2. See for a more detailed analysis of the risk management of novel projects: Loch et al. (2006). 
3. For a discussion of how one can protect intellectual property in environments with 1a weak legal 
framework see de Meyer and Garg (2005). 
4. One of the first seminal texts about this is Clark and Fujimoto (1990). 
5. One of the better documented can be found in Roussel et al. (1991). 
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